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Abstract 
The topic to be discussed here puts in focus the counter-
induction approach - the conditions, circumstances and 
incentives, which made Feyerabend to constitute it, and the 
enlightening role that it plays, respectively, should play. This 
opposite perspective de jure lacked science and de facto has 
always been implemented but as an illegitimate approach. 
In the methodological aspect of scientific research, the dual role 
of the methodical rules will be considered, which also help the 
research to be successful and even turn it into a dogma by 
narrowing and limiting the search because of their exclusivity. 
Relatedly. the tensions, criticisms and methodological 
developments will be taken into account to make the research 
more efficient. 
The aim is to show that counter-induction is met by a great deal 
of shortage in the methodological approach, which, as it will be 
argued, makes the research itself more open and removes its 
obstacles. 
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This paper pivots on a discussion of the counter-induction 
approach, and aims at arguing that the implementation of this 
method has an essential non-dogmatic dimension and a 
creative power in the scientific research. 
It is a well-known truism that scientific knowledge is 
impossible without the relevant instruments, i.e. without 
research methods. Such scientific instruments, i.e. different 
methods and techniques of research, give scientific character 
and depth to every knowledge. Their value lies in their rigor, 
defined by the rules according to which the scientists have to 
work. In this sense, the methodological rules are objective, and 
therefore valid for all users. 
In spite of their benefits, in scientific practice, the use of 
scientific instruments also shows a negative dimension. While 
the negative dimension is latent, and therefore less expressively 
accentuated, the rigidity of methodical rules has its limitations. 
The rigor of the rules, which gives the methods their dogmatic 
character, has infrequently caused obstacles to the research. 
Moreover, none of them have given any suggestion on how to 
overcome those difficulties. Such considerations gave rise to 
sharp methodological debate (Karl Popper, 2002a; Thomas 
Kuhn, 1970; Paul Feyerabend, 1993; Imre Lakatos in Lakatos & 
Musgrave, 1970), enhancing understanding into how from the 
methodological viewpoint of geocentrism one should be 
allowed taking into account heliocentrism as well, or from the 
latter any other alternative.   
It would be Paul Feyerabend who, in his masterpiece Against 
Method in 1975, synthesized all the philosophical and scientific 
examination of methodology: he made an assertion as no one 
before him, offering a theoretically unknown solution until 
then. His findings reslted in a collapse of confidence into the 
rules of the method. In fact, he also showed the validity as well 
as the legitimacy of the counter-rules (Feyerabend ,1993, p. 14). 
The opposite methodological perspective:  a non-dogmatic and novel approach 
Thesis, no.2, 2018    105 
The culminating idea after two decades’ reflections on the 
subject (at least from his 1965th “Consolation for the Specialist” 
debating article (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, pp. 197-229) was 
the counter-induction. 
This opposite methodological perspective provides an 
alternative approach to research which releases the rigidity of 
the methodological rules that narrow the scientific research 
providing only a given methodological action as scientifically 
valuable. Rather, the research activity becomes accessible 
without prejudice to any methodological rule. In this sense, it is 
methodologically equally legitimate in the scientific aspect 
working with a theory as with a hypothesis against it. This is a 
new approach to the scientific research, which throws away the 
methodological dogmatism and intolerance, making the 
scientific activity non-dogmatic, and thus rendering it with 
greater creative power. 
 
 
The rigor of the rules: two sides of the coin 
 
Each method has clearly defined rules that characterize a given 
approach and show how, the method should work and be used 
during a study. The methodological rules are rigorous, precise 
and exclusive. This is why their role is generally considered 
decisive for research just as Lekë Sokoli has rightly summed up, 
when stating that "Without scientific methods there is no 
scientific theory, so there is no scientific knowledge" (Sokoli, 
2013, p. 43). Imre Lakatos went even further, pointing out that 
methodology and theory are melted into one, i.e. in the 
methodology of scientific research programs (Lakatos in 
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970, pp. 132-138). 
Less emphasized is the fact that the methodological rules 
have a double character. On the one side, the rules determine 
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what is allowed to be done, in other words how to proceed in 
order to arrive at a conclusion. Therefore, following the rules is 
indispensable as far as it is done according to a given method. 
For example, the rules determine the inductive approach in a 
different way than the deductive line of research. Likewise, the 
qualitative approach differs from quantitative insights. Also, 
the different rules are those that differentiate the methods from 
one another, i.e. their approaches. For example, it is known that 
the rules of the inductive method determine that the research 
starts from observations of individual cases, of which a general 
conclusion has to be reached (Rothchild, 2006, p. 2); whereas the 
rules of the deductive method define an opposite approach, 
that from an accepted premise. and accordingly, has to be 
derived from the hypotheses that predicts specific data. Based 
on empirical findings, the hypothesis is subsequently either 
confirmed or rejected (Rothchild, 2006, p. 3). It is the rules that 
define and distinguish the qualitative and quantitative method 
(Cresswell, 2003, pp. 84-102), as well as the scope extended to 
their research, i.e., to understand in depth, or to understand in 
magnitude. 
Thus, the rules of the method show clearly what needs to be 
done according to their respective instructions. Their rigorous 
implementation makes the research substantiated, giving it an 
investigative character as claimed by the respective approach. 
The investigative character encompasses different ranges of 
research including the inductive type, or research of a 
deductive, qualitative or quantitative research nature. The 
usefulness of the research methodology is that it specifies how 
to achieve the predicted evidence, rendering the research 
focused, persistent, and usually successful. However, the other 
side of the coin is that since the rigorous application of the 
methodical rules is required, the research becomes narrow and 
limited, assigning it with a somewhat dogmatic character. 
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The dogmatic character derives from the rules of the method 
according to which only the empirical data obtainable from the 
defined methodological search action are acceptable. Findings 
that are not the result of the fulfillment of those rules are 
considered as meaningless data, and correspondingly, they are 
deemed lacking scientific weight, and therefore, discarded or 
ignored. For example, in inductive research, only specific 
evidence that is similar is required to enable arriving at a 
scientifically found conclusion (Papineau, 2005, p. 4), and 
anything that conflicts or is not alike has to be dismissed as not 
in alignment with the concept. The deductive research, which 
concerns a hypothesis drafted from the premise seeks to find 
only data predicted by the hypothesis; and, as Popper (2002a) 
emphasized, if the findings are compatible the hypothesis will 
(temporarily) be confirmed. In turn, however, if the findings are 
contrary to the predictions - then the hypothesis will be falsified 
(Popper, 2002a, pp. 55-56, 57- 73). Furthermore, conflicting 
findings and the missing of predicted data that may prove a 
hypothesis wrong may render the risk of remaining out of the 
methodological attention. The same can be said concerning the 
quantitative and qualitative research division.  While in 
qualitative research, the purpose and scope of the research 
concerns an in-depth understanding based on case studies, 
where the numerical magnitude of the study is set outside the 
researchers’ field of interest. In contrast to the qualitative 
approach, the quantitative research involves an understanding 
of the magnitude of the research object (Creswell, 2003, p. 84-
102) without placing decisive weight on particular cases.  
However, the scientific practice has undoubtedly proven 
that the application of the roles of the method in particular 
cases is usually scientifically useful as it puts empirical 
evidence needed in the focus of a specific research. Such 
examples are the discovery of the Higgs boson (Abazi, 2018, p. 
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58), and the confirmation of the gravitational waves (Abazi, 
2018, pp. 59-60), which took several decades. Examples like 
these show that persistence and the consistency of the approach 
is, of course, what gives value to the rules of the method. 
However, scientific practice has also witnessed that during the 
research scholars are often met with findings (hypothesis and 
data) that are far from consistent with the empirical focus, and, 
in spite of this reality, none of the methods (until the counter-
induction was formed) gives any suggestion of what to do with 
those findings. Rather, they are simply considered and treated a 
priori as useless and non-scientific. This methodological 
behavior as determined by the rules of the method becomes 
latently dogmatic, as it considers other alternative approaches 
illegitimate, and therefore not scientific, conversely causing 
stagnation in the research. 
 
 
Criticism of methods 
 
The rigidity of the methodical rules as an obstacle has been 
understood by various philosophers as well as scientists, who 
have put it under the anvil of criticism. While at times 
alternately criticized or in more moderate terms by various 
scholars, serious problems have been consistently uncovered. 
All critics of any method have advocated some other method, 
and thus put forward from their given methodological position. 
The first to address the issue beyond a definite methodological 
stance were Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. 
Though the trajectory of the criticisms to methods goes 
through centuries in history, in the current paper, the 
contemporary debate will be primarily considered, a debate 
which sometimes escalated to argue for any method as a non-
scientific approach, as Karl Popper did in his famous The Logic 
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of Scientific Discovery in 1935, in which he argues against the 
inductive method (Popper, 2002a, pp. 3-17).  When logical 
positivism was at its height in the 1930s, the inductive method 
was almost identified - if not entirely - as the main scientific 
method in the natural disciplines; at such frequencies were 
most philosophers of science among whom Moritz Schlick, Otto 
Neurath, Hans Han, Rudolf Carnap to name a few. Only Karl 
Popper had another point of view, strongly criticizing the 
logical positivism’s approach (Popper, 2002a, pp. 3-17, 248-268 
when arriving at the conclusion that induction results either 
“[…]  in endless regression, or in the doctrine of apriorism! (p. 6). 
Popper did not leave, of course, the science without method. 
His powerful advocacy was for the deductive approach 
(Popper, 2002a, p. 10), which, as he believed, was the only true 
scientific method (ibid.). This method, however, would be hit in 
the heart by Bertrand Russell. Speaking of the Euclid Elements, 
calling it one of the greatest books ever written and one of the 
most perfect monuments of the Greek intellect, he expresses a 
very sharp critique. According to Russell, the great work of 
Euclid "has, of course, the typical Greek limitations: the method 
is purely deductive, and there is no way, within it, of testing the 
initial assumptions" (Russell, 2003, p. 221), since such 
assumptions, being considered as the main premises, i.e. as true 
theories, were considered to be unquestionable. What Russell 
wanted to say is this: As the testing of specific propositions was 
based on the essential assumptions of the theory, the fault 
stems from the fact that these essential assumptions, although 
taken as true, might be wrong, as, for example, in the 19th 
century, it was shown that the initial assumptions of Euclid's 
work could have been wrong and that only observations could 
decide whether they were so (ibid.) This appropriate criticism 
of Russell has been supported throughout the history of science: 
from around the third century BC, most philosophers and 
Hajdin Abazi 
110     Thesis, no. 2, 2018     
scientists of astronomy considered the essential assumption of 
geocentric theory on earth as the center of the universe as true, 
and accordingly, astronomers had been led through centuries in 
their scientific work by that "initial assumption", which was 
shown to be erroneous. Another example can be found in the 
social sciences: The essential assumption of socialism was the 
claim for social justice as the equality of well-being of all 
citizens, which has been shown to be erroneous too (now it is 
known that after many decades of the "experimentation" - in 
Russia and elsewhere - the social reality in the former socialist 
countries showed the contrary: social injustice and inequalities 
in well-being had grown and deepened, with the consequence 
that the workers and peasants were depleted into slave labor, 
while the bureaucratic and technocratic classes and party caste 
were enriched and transformed into rulers). 
Despite the mutual criticisms of philosophers who 
considered one method as being most scientific than the other, 
whether concerning the inductive or the deductive method 
likewise in terms of quantitative and qualitative approaches or 
any other method, scientific experience, as Steven Eric Krauss 
(2005) suggests, showed that no method is more scientific than 
the other (Krauss, 2005, pp. 758-761). This perception is 
widespread: Despite the plurality of methods, the methods 
employed by the researchers are many and varied, as 
underlined in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
where it is stated that all are scientific methods (REP, 1998, pp. 
7769-7773). 
Criticism of the diverse methods has yielded fruitful benefits 
to science. As Krauss (2005) emphasizes, the criticisms have led 
to improvements that made it possible for the best 
understanding of each mode of research and the possibilities of 
their mixing (Krauss, 2005, pp. 761-762). In social sciences, 
limitations and the insufficiency of the qualitative or 
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quantitative method as exclusive research approaches has given 
rise for a need for their combination, which has resulted in the 
widespread use of the mixed-method approach, which is 
hitherto considered as a “legitimate alternative" even in the 
field of medicine, where it is increasingly gaining popularity 
(Doyle, Brady & Bryne, 2009, pp. 175-185). The use of the mixed 
method developed in the mid-twentieth century, and has been 
broadly in use since 1980 (McKim, 2017, p. 202). And according 
to the same author, the mixed method is now used by well-
known scholars like Creswell, JW (2003), Creswell, JW, & Plano 
Clark, VL (2007), Dunning, H., Williams, A., Abonyi, S. & 
Crooks, V. (2008) etc.  
Once the methodical rules are constituted, they are modified 
with difficulty in a long, complex process presented with 
arguments and counter-arguments and coupled with 
philosophical tensions. An example is the debate that has 
caused the problem of the induction: It became a challenge to 
find any solution and to overcome it. Some of the main efforts 
of this enterprise are presented in Papineau's Methodology (2005, 
pp. 8-13), which sets out with the solution Popper claimed by 
eliminating the induction itself as a method and its alternative 
through the deductive testing in the scientific research. 
Subsequently, the new problem of Goodman's induction as an 
issue of distinguishing "projectable" predicates (those that are 
rooted in practices used by the human community to produce 
inductive conclusions in the past) from "non-projectable" 
(Papineau, 2005, pp. 19-22) is discussed. On this basis, Papineau 
(2005, pp. 13-19, 60-72) pleads for the inductive approach, 
expanding and explaining some aspects, while arguing that this 
method is useful in scientific research. Similar criticisms for and 
against the inductive and deductive approach can be found in 
many reviews (Rotchild, 2006; Medewar, 1996; Popper, 2002a; 
Ayer, 1971).  
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Unlike the above criticisms with regards to criticizing the 
rigor and strict character of the methodical rules, Thomas Kuhn 
has presented us with another point of view, namely that there 
are no criteria in the sense of the rules of any method or 
methodology to be of universal validity in order to determine 
the status of a theory beforehand (Kuhn in Lakatos & 
Musgrave, 1970, pp. 19, 237). This was argued by the fact that 
there was no methodological rule to be more valid than the 
following theory: "Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, 
and more complete than any set of rules for research that could 
be unequivocally abstracted from them” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46). In 
this regard, Feyerabend (1993) went on further by pointing out 
that "all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their 
limits" (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 23). 
 
 
Attempts to find suitable research rules 
 
Driven by the scientific practice and the difficulties caused by 
the rules of the methods scientists and philosophers have 
continuously detected obstacles regarded the methodical rules, 
and thus have understood the need to extend the approach and 
partially change it. These enterprises express the effort to find 
suitable rules for research in attempts at overcoming their 
limitations and avoid stagnation. 
Many centuries ago, Francis Bacon made such an 
examination. At the time when the inductive method was at its 
peak as a scientific approach, Bacon had already stressed in his 
Novum Organum published in 1620, that by targeting only 
positive instances as the approach was deficient. According to 
Milton, Bacon had realized that, to work according to the claim, 
the inductive approach could have benefits from both instances, 
the positive as well as the negative ones (Milton, 1998, p. 766; 
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Bacon, 1902, p. 130). This is why Bacon found out that, in order 
not to remain isolated in the conceptual framework, two rules 
should be applied by the researcher: (i) to la[y] aside received 
opinions and notions; and (ii) to restrain […] from the 
generalizations (Bacon, 1902, i, pp. 106-107). 
This contribution was not the only one, nor an isolated work. 
On the contrary. The sciences guided by rigorous methodical 
rules constantly encounter hypotheses or data that cannot be 
accommodated in the theoretical framework like paradigm. 
Findings impossible to become naturally integrated parts of the 
theoretical framework are called anomalies (Kuhn, 1970, p. 52; 
Lakatos. 1989, p. 53; Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 11-12), and that is 
why they remain beyond research considerations. 
Understanding the limitations of the rules, different 
philosophers of science and scientists attempted to find a more 
open, non-dogmatic approach that would methodologically 
make the research more efficient. The logical positivists from 
the standpoint of verification rules, conceived as anomalous 
certain claims in science, like the "meaningless assertions" and 
the metaphysical assertions that were considered empty (Ayer, 
1959, p. 145). According to logical positivists, metaphysical 
assertions did not refer to anything in reality, which is why 
such non-scientific or pseudo-scientific claims had to be 
cleansed from the science courtyard, so that scientists could 
work only with empirical predictions. With all good intentions, 
if scientists would strictly apply the methodical rules of the 
logical positivists as set against the metaphysical assertions, the 
result would be quite the opposite. If all the claims not referred 
to in empirical reality had to be eliminated, then the 
methodological rules of the logical positivists themselves 
should be eliminated too as "meaningless assertions”, and 
resultantly, as rightly claimed Karl Popper (2002a), the result 
would be the elimination of science itself (Popper, 2002a, p. 14). 
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To solve the methodological problem brought by the logical 
positivists, Karl Popper (2002b) introduced another approach 
believed by him to be compatible with the scientific practice. 
The methodical rules constructed were much more liberal as no 
assertion should be prejudiced in advance. The methodological 
rules defined the testing of the theories, which had to be 
twofold: On the one hand, a theory must face another theory, 
and on the other, each of theories had to face the empirical 
evidence. The status of each theory in the end had to be 
determined by the result of the experiment. To sum it up, 
Popper points out that the methodological goal of scientists had 
to be finding and eliminating false theories (Popper, 2002b, pp. 
19, 66-67).  
Popper's (2002b) falsifications methodology seems to clean 
the yard of science from deceptive theoretical fruits, which on 
the surface seemed to be true but were in fact not. Such rules 
would, in fact, have the contrary effect, which Thomas Kuhn 
argued already in his well-known The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions published in 1962. According to Kuhn, new theories 
have always less support in empirical evidence compared to the 
old theories. Hence, the methodological rules of falsification, as 
well as those of verification, and even the combined 
verification-falsification rules (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 146-147) would 
not methodologically provide the claimed results. 
The debate of philosophers and scientists has always 
highlighted certain limitations of methodological rules and 
their negative effects. Their contributions, through critical 
approaches, aimed the opening of the way for changes in the 
rules of the methods, so that they became more suitable to the 
scientific practice. The hope to find suitable rules became a 
myth since after every correctional change, it became always 
obvious that the rules, however flexible, were deficient and had 
limitations. This was convincingly emphasized by Thomas 
The opposite methodological perspective:  a non-dogmatic and novel approach 
Thesis, no.2, 2018    115 
Kuhn (1970), who stated that there are no methodologies, rules 
or criteria to have universal validity, and that, as such, their 
validity was limited only to a given paradigm. He even pointed 
out that compared to every rules or criteria it is the paradigm 
which has the priority (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46). Lakatos (1989) 
synthesizes this when constructing a methodology molded in 
theory, which in his view was seen as a scientific research 
program (which is like Kuhn’s paradigm) with very tolerant 
criteria like that progressive-degenerative ones. In the end, 
however, he ascertained that his criteria are valid only post hoc 
(Lakatos, 1989, p. 112).  
The trajectory of efforts in finding suitable rules and the 
continuing failure of any rule to be as alleged, made Paul 
Feyerabend (1993) to understand that no methodological rule 
can be entirely suitable for research. Consequently, he 
expressed the main deficiency to date, which could be seen 
from the opposite methodological perspective in order to assert 
the following conclusion:   
 
... there is not a single rule however plausible, and however 
firmly grounded in epistemology that is not violated at some 
time or other. It becomes evident that such violations are not 
accidental events, they are not results of insufficient 
knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided 
(Feyerabend, 1993, p.14). 
 
 
The counter-induction - a new and different method 
 
Feyerabend (1993) took lessons from the history of science in 
order to look at scientific research from the position of the 
counter-rules’ perspective. The lesson was this:  
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[…] given any rule, however 'fundamental' or 'rational', 
there are always circumstances when it is advisable not only to 
ignore the rule but to adopt its opposite (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 
14).  
From this point of view, he formulated the principle of 
"everything goes" (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 19), upon which the 
counter-inductive approach is based (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 20).  
Feyerabend (1993) had realized that the lack of the opposite 
perspective had almost exhausted scientific research, narrowing 
it down and shrinking i, so that the dominant rules had to be 
broken once, to make the finding of the solution possible. The 
scientific research had to be methodologically released, which 
could be done according to Feyerabend (1993) by legitimizing 
the approach contrary to the rules or according to the counter-
rules. This is his contribution to the science: the counter-
induction. This method would make the methodological 
approach open and science would become more effective in the 
research of reality, as the search for knowledge would not be 
confined exclusively to the eliminatory rules. Rather, 
everything could be put into the focus of science as worthy of 
research if a team of scientists would see it as good as possible. 
Then, how does one work with the methodological novelty 
Feyerabend (1993) brought? 
The counter-induction, as its name suggests, is an approach 
that legitimizes any scientific claim, however contradictory to 
the dominant theory. It suggests, on the one hand, “the 
counterrule that urges us to develop hypotheses inconsistent 
with accepted and highly confirmed theories”, and, on the 
other, “the counterrule that urges us to develop hypotheses 
inconsistent with well-established facts” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 
20). 
While each method requires creating hypotheses that do not 
conflict with well-confirmed theories and develop hypotheses 
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that do not conflict with well-established facts, the method of 
Feyerabend seeks the opposite. In other words, if there are 
hypotheses that conflict with accepted theories or scientific 
facts, counter-induction suggests not eliminating them but 
turning the focus back on them; in the absence of opposing 
hypotheses, it suggests to induce them. 
To acquire a better understanding, let us remember that, for 
example, according to the rules, inductive research requires 
completely similar data that form a certain class, in which 
nothing can be inserted except the class members assigned by 
definition. This is the typical mode of action by the inductive 
approach, and this cannot be changed, as long conclusion 
through induction is desired. This, in essence, also occurs with 
the deductive approach, according to which are acceptable only 
the specific cases compatible with its essential premise (theory, 
law), while other cases are eliminated. The same applies to the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, as well as all other 
methods, which must follow specific rules to maintain the 
research as characterized by their nature. In contrast to all 
methods, the counter-induction method has its own focus on 
what is distinguishable and different; that which contradicts the 
rules under which a research is made; that which cannot be 
included in the conceptual framework of the methodological 
strict and eliminating rules, the one that is opposed to them. 
Thus, by founding the counter-inductive approach as a 
methodological rule, Feyerabend (1993) has contributed to 
preventing scientists from falling into dogmatic frameworks of 
rigidity of methodical rules that make them ignore, disregard or 
consider absurd hypothesis or empirical evidence because they 
are excluded by methodological rules. In this sense, the 
outcome of counter-induction is that the science becomes more 
open and looser in the research of understanding the reality. 
That is why counter-induction is an alternative approach that 
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has emerged essentially from the stagnation of research, and as 
a consequence of applying the strict rules It is also put forward 
as an alternative to change the research course in a mild 
manner and with minimal consequences. 
The counter-inductive approach does not forbid scientists 
from acting according to the methodical rules that research 
teams may consider appropriate and to be guided by them. On 
the contrary: if in order to develop a theory a counter-
hypothesis would require the use of inductive or deductive 
approach for instance, that would be fine. The primary notion 
of a counter-inductive approach is the right to allow scientists 
to apply other rules in cases considered as suitable. It means 
allowing the possibility, without any consequence, to act 
against standard methodological concepts that allow consistent 
and compatible approaches while excluding and prohibiting 
every other approach. In other words, that was defines the 
counter-inductive research is the legitimacy of approaches 
contrary to the rules of the applied method, i.e. counter-action. 
The intention is restraining scientists from prejudices towards 
the exclusivity of some scientific instruments, to allow the use 
of any rule and method that could make fruitful the scientific 
research at arriving at empirical knowledge. In other words, 
counter-induction does not require the dominance, nor 
exclusivity as the only valid or most valuable in general. Rather, 
it requires legitimacy as a scientific instrument just like all other 
research methods that scientists can use when any other 
instrument does not give the expected result or prevents 
achieving a result. The counter-inductive approach can also, in 
se, be considered as valid in achieving knowledge of reality that 
cannot be done by any other method. 
Then, it becomes obvious that only when we realize that not 
just a single method is applicable, but that each method without 
the exclusion of another, and including the counter-inductive 
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method, which enables fruitful research is of a scientific nature. 
In this sense, the use of just a certain methodology is not of 
decisive importance, but any methodological approach that 
enables successful inquiry when some other methodology does 
not make this possible. It is only by taking this into account, i.e. 
in such a context, that the above statement (Sokoli, 2013, p. 43) 
becomes meaningful: there is no scientific knowledge without a 
scientific method, whichever it is, which makes research 
successful. 
 
 
Counter-induction as a methodologically alternative 
approach 
 
To illustrate the functionality and openness of the counter-
induction approach, Feyerabend (1993) has, discussed the 
Galileo Galileo's inquisition (Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 77-146). In 
Galileo's time, the dominant methodological rules of the 
geocentric astronomy prohibited any other approach. Because 
of the narrowness of the methodological rules, any hypothesis 
that conflicted with geocentrism was unacceptable, as well as 
any empirical findings that could not be accommodated 
through methodical rules with that astronomical reality. If 
hypotheses and findings were not legitimate, they were banned 
methodologically and were considered non-scientific. The 
geocentric methodology had produced knowledge of 
astronomy based on the geocentric vision, that is why it was 
forbidden to act otherwise than in accordance with its own 
rules. If the geocentric methodology was strictly implemented, 
it would oppose everything that is contradictory or inconsistent 
with it, and after attempts, if they did not get accommodated, 
they would be dismissed as incompatible. 
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The same can be said of social sciences, specifically following 
the earlier example of socialism. The methodological rules of 
socialism accepted only the hypotheses that were in line with 
the socialist order, as well as the empirical findings conform to 
the theoretical predictions of socialism. They reject any 
hypotheses that could not become suitable with socialist rules 
as well as any findings that undermine socialist predictions. 
Moreover, such findings would be treated as illegitimate 
because they were methodologically banned. The outcome 
would be soon known: after unsuccessful attempts to 
accommodate them, they would be methodologically termed as 
anomalies. 
In either of above examples, traditionally there would be no 
other legitimacy except for the methodologically prevailing 
rules. They would, of course, not allow anything that would 
collide with them. Moreover, incompatible findings would be 
eliminated. The methodological rules are the guards that select 
what is acceptable and what is not. If strictly followed by the 
respective communities, then geocentric astronomy and 
socialism, though incompatible with reality, would remain 
eternal. Thus, such methodological rules become conservative 
and dogmatic, transforming a given scientific or social situation 
into an unaltered state. 
Of course, getting out of this situation is possible. 
Feyerabend (1993) has shown that changes usually come 
through breaking existing rules (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 14). 
Realizing that such actions are indispensable historically, 
Feyerabend (1993) constituted counter-rule as an approach 
(Feyerabend, 1993, p. 20). The main principle is that at a time 
when the rules turn into inhibitors and become detrimental to 
the research, it would be advisable to act according to the 
counter-induction manner. Counter-induction is a methodical 
rule of the alternative approach, which means that if a rule 
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shrinks the cognitive research up to stagnation, then the 
alternative approach must be considered as legitimate and 
scientific. 
Thus, accepting the counter-induction as integral to the 
existing scientific methodologies, methodological support to 
oppose any team of scientists who have alternative theories or 
who deal with the research of the predictions of any hypothesis 
that conflicts with the dominant paradigm would be reduced. 
The same extends to empirical findings that at first sight 
conflicts with facts or reality as it is known. These counter-
inductive rules liberate science from the methodological 
limitations and turn the main focus on knowing the reality, 
respectively the epistemological aspect. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
From the point of view posed above, it is seen that science has 
evolved even with regard to the methodological aspect of the 
research. Mainly from experience in scientific activity, it has 
become clear that all the rules of the methods at some particular 
moment of research have been shown to be rigid and have 
turned into important stumbling blocks in successful research 
by curbing the study. In this way, it was shown by few but 
important examples of natural and social sciences that the strict 
application of the methodical rules at any given moment may 
turn against the very nature of the research. We have clarified 
the fact that the strict application of the methodical rules 
compels following a certain knowing of reality, not allowing 
another possible knowing of reality as it indeed may actually 
be.  
Applying the methodical rules with its consistency may 
causes from time to time a stagnation in the research due to the 
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latent dogmatism that compels compliance with the rules. 
Although many philosophers and scientists have contributed to 
liberalize the methodical rules, it was Paul Feyerabend (1993) 
who understood correctly the practical action of scientists, that 
is, how the stagnation of research had passed. This resulted in 
an unknown theoretical solution until then: counter-induction. 
Science supplemented with this method, which had thus far 
been lacking, constituted the whole methodical arsenal, and 
departed from the notion of research not becoming the prey of 
methodological frameworks. With Feyerabend’s (1993) 
contribution, the alternative action of counter-induction has 
theoretically become legitimate. Science has taken away the 
methodical obstruction and has now become methodologically 
liberalized. 
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